Path dependence and novelties in Russian innovation by unknown
EDITORIAL Open Access
Path dependence and novelties in Russian
innovation
Irina Dezhina1* and Henry Etzkowitz2
* Correspondence:
i.dezhina@skoltech.ru
1Group on Science and Industrial
Policy, Skolkovo Institute of Science
and Technology, Nobelya str., 3,
Moscow 143026, Russia
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Introduction
Russia has a relatively consistent innovation policy, despite significant changes in the
political sphere, from the break-up of the Soviet Union to the re-centralizing of polit-
ical control during the Putin era. Government was and is the central actor in the
innovation system; this system continues to be hierarchical. A hierarchical innovation
leadership format well precedes the Soviet Union and may be traced back to
innovation modernizers like Peter the Great who established the key institutions of
vertical innovation. Nevertheless, a minor key of horizontal triple helix interactions,
exemplified by several universities that have explicitly taken on an entrepreneurial mis-
sion, has emerged as a complement to centralization, the persisting path dependent
major key of Russian Innovation policy and practice.
The Russian science and technology system, after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
has experienced an ongoing attempt at reform. This effort is characterized by adoption
of models from abroad, for example, universities that combine multiple missions of
teaching and research as well as innovation and entrepreneurship. Previously, univer-
sities were largely confined to education in relative isolation from research institutes.
Although this system persists, its importance is reduced, given the increasing signifi-
cance of universities as research providers.
Although instituted top down, complemented with research funding agencies, this
reform introduces a horizontal and even bottom-up element into Russian innovation
practice as universities are more or less expected to find their own way in implement-
ing this reform. Indeed, the government’s sponsoring of university metrics may be seen
as an effort, to influence and track these developments, without trying to exercise strict
bureaucratic controls.
Some horizontal linkages develop in selected innovative clusters (between large and
small companies), in technology platforms that initiate new joint R&D projects. Aside
from that, the current system becomes less disconnected as institutes become more in-
volved in teaching, and teaching universities do research and some subset become
entrepreneurial, spinning off start-ups, with government seeming to encourage this
trend. But centralizing ambitions may be beyond the reach of attainment. In regions
where administration cares about innovative development, external conditions for
R&D and innovation may be fixed to some extent. Regional governments for that pur-
pose use tax mechanisms, improve customs service, and invest in infrastructure.
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Regional universities in such places are oriented towards closer cooperation with local
industry both in research and training of new workforce.
Government’s innovation role
The role of government is important in any country, even in the well horizontally devel-
oped systems, but government functions are different there. Government should be regu-
lator, not dictator. In between hands-off regulator and dictator is a Public Entrepreneur
model characteristic, for example of the USA, going well beyond regulation, but yet not
attempting to monopolize direction. Government plays a variety of roles from providing
research funds to academia in areas that government has an interest in innovation that
helps it fulfill its explicit functions to more direct formats in which government agencies
formulate and carry out their own R&D projects.
The quintessential US strategy has been for government to incentivize and encourage
university and industry to work together with government on innovation projects. The
initiative for these projects can come from various sources; thus, the Genome project
emerged from the Energy Department and National Institutes of Health from within
government during the 1990s, the Sematech initiative from the semiconductor industry
in response to Japanese competition during the 1980s, and the Manhattan project from
academia during the Second World War.1
In Russia, the Soviet legacy when everything is under government control continues
to be very strong. For example, in a draft strategy for scientific-technological develop-
ment of the Russian Federation till the year 2035, one of the suggestions is to make
government responsible for all technology transfer in the country. This is only at the
level of intention, but the trend towards centralization is evident. Institutes for develop-
ment help with technology transfer, and each of them has its own niche. But this kind
of mentality may be also found at the level of institutional leadership: “old generations”
of directors dream about reincarnation of “branch science” and system of “vnedreniya”
(deployment) when novelty moves from R&D to production chain under government
push. This is now more at the level of mentality, not actual possibility.
Today in Russia, government continues to be the major source of financing for R&D
and the input from business is decreasing. The share of federal government is about
70 % in the total expenditures on R&D, and business enterprise sector invests about
25–27 %. Government support grows more rapidly than financing from companies.
Official statistics does not allow us to define companies from which branches invest
more. However, indirectly it may be said that these are big state companies in re-
source extracting industries: they provide up to 80 % of total financing for R&D.
Other sources are also decreasing. In particular, the result of government policy re-
garding “foreign agents” and “unwelcomed” organization is in the decrease of foreign fi-
nancing for R&D. The majority of foreign agents are foundations of US origin and
private foundations (like Dynasty Fund of Dmitry Zimin).
At the same time, government realizes the problem of insufficient results in S&T and
is searching for instruments to improve the situation. Usually, the source of ideas is for-
eign experience. Foreign experience is carefully and regularly studied by universities, re-
search organizations, and academy institutes by request of federal agencies responsible
for the development in S&T (like Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development, and Ministry of Industry and Trade).
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At the present time, the new framework idea of “grand challenges” is introduced to
the scientific community. It is based on the assumption that grand challenges shape the
choice of technological priorities that the government should support.
Over the last 25 years, many new measures were introduced, including support of
universities, privatization of former branch R&D institutes, reform of the Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences, creation of innovative infrastructure, establishment of science founda-
tions and institutes for development, and start of prestigious infrastructural projects,
such as Skolkovo, Innopolis, and Moscow State University (MSU) Technological Valley.
A separate set of horizontal instruments was established in order to stimulate linkages
in innovation system: technological platforms, innovative clusters, encouraging mobil-
ity, project consortia between research institutes (universities) and companies, and
others.
The outcome of all that activity is less impressive than the list of implemented mea-
sures. What went wrong? To the date, the answer may be quality and mentality of gov-
ernment regulation, within and outside of the S&T area.
University’s innovation role
Universities in Russia were mainly teaching institutes under the regulation of the law
“About Education in RF.” At the present time, they continue to be mainly teaching in-
stitutes but the role of research and innovation has visibly increased. There is a growing
share of research conducted in universities and increasing number of personnel in-
volved in R&D. Publication record is also improving. Universities receive big support
from the government, especially the leading group of 20+ universities that enjoy gener-
ous financial support. Aside from the appreciation of research and innovation, univer-
sities become more aware of the “entrepreneurial university” concept. The ideas of
such type also come from abroad, sometimes in an exaggerated form. For example, in
the mid-2000, a popular idea among universities was that their major income may be
from technology commercialization, such as selling patents and licenses. This was the
result of the misunderstanding of how best American universities work.
At the same time, government policy towards universities may be characterized as
“picking winners,” which leads to segregation among higher educational institutes.
Those who are not in a leading group have to be really innovative for the sake of sur-
vival. So the change is under way, whether more or less resources. And it continues to
be a question which is the most effective driver of innovation. The US example shows
that public universities, including leaders like Berkeley, are under similar extreme fi-
nancial pressures, with reduction from 25 to 9 % of state support in the past decade.
They look for donors, which is not a possibility for Russia. There are too few univer-
sities with endowments in Russia, and this culture of giving is not developed neither
mentally nor economically. Donors do not have any tax privileges when they give out
money for charitable purposes.
Important government push towards better research in universities is based on a con-
fusing stimulus to be higher in international ratings. In a way it is now an international
phenomenon. Ratings may be good if they are based on fair metrics. However, at the
present time, the role of bibliometric and quantitative indicators is overstated. A more
variegated metrics, including start-up creation and growth, contribution to regional
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economy and society, and a balance between quantitative and qualitative indicators, are
required.
Influence of government course is visible through the changing focus of university
research: growing expenditures on defense R&D make universities move towards
this type of activities. Some universities are particularly bright examples at this
respect—TUSUR (Tomsk)—as well as a number of technical universities in Moscow. In
the TUSUR case, algorithmic expertise became the basis of firms, some of whose aim was
to improve the technologies of older mechanical industries. In other instances, software
with advanced capabilities was developed and marketed as start-up firms in Silicon Valley.
The entrepreneurial direction at TUSUR, founded as a highly specialized research in-
stitute that had developed teaching programs, emerged as a response to the reduction
of government funding for the University’s role in the space and military programs.
More recently, as government funding for military research increased, TUSUR was
drawn back into its former role. TUSUR’s entrepreneurial role has been picked up by
Tomsk Polytechnic, the university that TUSUR originally spun-off from at the height of
success of the Soviet space program. The case illustrates the transition of academic in-
stitutions to a more differentiated role in Russian society, moving away from the single
purpose mode of the Soviet era.
Industry’s innovation role
Industry is also changing though by formal indicators, the change is the least visible.
Big state companies are not very innovative and not willing to invest much in R&D.
Their technological development is based, to a considerable extent, on import of equip-
ment. Sanctions are stimulus for innovations in a limited number of areas, like food
production, textile industry, or any other industries, that may easily start the production
of own components for products. Survey conducted by the Russian Venture company in
2015 among 196 respondents from government, business, and science has demonstrated
that almost two thirds of respondents think that sanctions hamper innovations.
In many cases, sanctions have led to the change in the country-supplier of new tech-
nology. Small innovative companies, though supported through various government in-
stitutes for development, suffer from unfavorable economic environment and lack of
connections with big companies (lack of consumers). On a positive side, there is
growing number of successfully developing medium-sized companies. The largest
share of such companies, according to the 2016 survey conducted by the Higher
School of Economics by the order of Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, is
in instrument making, electronics, IT, and pharmaceuticals. Most of such companies
were established at the beginning of 1990s by engineers or specialists in hard sciences.
Medium-sized company is defined as the one with the annual income between 50
million and up to 10 billion RUR. They invest in R&D and innovation, find new cus-
tomers and market niches, and demonstrate up to 15 % of annual income growth.
The number of these companies is not large, but they give a hope that high-tech busi-
ness may develop in Russia. Such companies usually have well-established linkages
with universities though universities are mainly seen by them as a source of new em-
ployees, and not partners for R&D. Such companies prefer to conduct in-house R&D.
They take part in many government programs, including the ones related to venture
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funds and various grants, but many of them say that government financial support is
important but not crucial.
Civil society’s innovation role
Society is an important part of the whole innovation system. Society may be seen in
two projections. First, society is a taxpayer, the one who should understand the value
of science and support it. In Russia, respect to a researcher engineer is rather low—it
was not the case in the Soviet Union where salary of teaching staff and researchers
was higher than average and academic freedom put them in a special privileged
working conditions. The change has occurred partially because of comparatively low
income of such specialists. Additionally, popularization of science and technologies
in Russia was during the last 25 years at a very modest scale. Citizens do not under-
stand what science gives them; instead in newspapers and magazines, one may read
about scandals and rumors around institutes for development (ROSNANO, Skolk-
ovo, MSU Technological Valley), or scandals around reform of RAS, or about con-
frontation between academy institutes and universities in their fight for federal
money.
Second, society may be seen as citizen science, reflections of which are crowdsour-
cing, Wikipedia, and other novelties from recent times. In another words, society in
this case is a source of ideas. Citizen science, in turn, usually may prosper only in civil
society. Civil society in Russia is underdeveloped. Indeed, the very term now has a ra-
ther negative connotation since it was brought to the country by foreign (mostly
American) foundations. Building civil society was in their agenda, and some elements
of civil society do exist in Russia. For example, the Society of Scientific Researchers
which is a union of scientists, researchers, and even scientific journalists who are inter-
ested in problems around the scientific complex and are ready to raise their voice in
support (or against) new policy measures. But overall, the attempt of foreigners to ex-
pand civil society failed. Nevertheless, an indigenous civil society tradition expressed in
samizdat and underground artistic movements during the Soviet era and in the attempt
to build an independent media during the post-Soviet era, persists.
Having such composition and characteristics of actors, where is Russia going now?
The government tries to set a new agenda and to find novel ways of setting priorities in
S&T. First, it is National Technology Initiative, announced by the President in 2014.
The idea is to move from demand to supply—from potential market niches that could
Russia occupy to the search for necessary resources that country needs in order to be-
come one of technological leaders. The approach is complex and deals not only with
science and technology but also with the system of education (starting from kinder gar-
dens), societal views, and revision of conditions, external to S&T. Second, the Russian
government is going to set new goals and instruments specifically in science and tech-
nology, by developing Strategy for scientific-technological development till the year
2035. This document should formulate “big goal” for scientific and technological com-
plex. So far, in NationalTechnology Initiative, ten promising net markets are identified,
including aero, auto, marinet, finnet, neuronet, safenet, technet, and some others. In
order to enter any of these markets, new technologies should be developed in such
areas as new materials, Big Data, and photonics.
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It is not clear yet what will be the balance between reliance on natural advantages
that the country possesses (like good math education and special schools for gifted chil-
dren that allow Russia to be among world winners in various math and IT contests)
and needs to develop certain areas and even branches (like advanced manufacturing or
agricultural sector).
Some initiatives may be restructured according to “grand challenges”—for example,
Skoltech may build more capacity based on national technological priorities (photonics,
neurotechnologies, advanced manufacturing, IT), as well as leading universities may re-
consider their priority subject areas in teaching courses. Skolkovo Fund priorities
shifted from a mix of old and new topics to more advanced, more highly focused
choices. At the same time, formal structure of “clusters” in Skolkovo Fund stays the
same. Finally, it should be underlined that external environment to science and techno-
logical development is playing an important role in Russia. Tax and customs regula-
tions, visa requirements, regulation of mobility, etc., all these mechanisms should be
enhanced so that Russia could transform itself into horizontally developed triple helix.
The “Russian Collection” in the Triple Helix journal
The issue presents a “Russian collection” of papers. It includes five papers which are
related to the Triple Helix theory and model. However, aside from that, this selection
of papers brings the light to the nature and specificity of linkages among various ac-
tors in innovation system. The problem of lacking linkages is especially sharp for
Russia. It has been discussed for years but still remains far from being solved. What is
the reason? The Triple Helix model is not working in Russia, and the linkages are
mostly vertical, not horizontal—the system is centered on the State. Federal financing
for R&D is overwhelming, and most of organizations dealing with science and innova-
tions are government-owned or government-regulated. This creates double helices of
relationships—“government-industry,” “government-universities,” and “government-
research institutes.” In these pairs, government plays a leading role. The pair “science-
industry” is also present but it is not strong. Its strengthening is an important task
for Russia and that is why three out of five papers are exploring different aspects of
these relationships between science and business, mechanisms of knowledge transfer
through various mechanisms, including circulation of workforce, joint work on
shared equipment, establishment of startups by universities, and some others.
Two remaining papers bring readers to the next level, by looking at the processes on
the whole-country scale and in comparative perspective with other countries which are
overcoming similar formidable obstacles. Russia is compared with China (Balzer, Askonas)
which has a much longer history of reforms in science (75 years against 25 in Russia). An-
other macro-case is Armenia (Inzelt), a country that was a part of the Soviet Union and
thus inherited many features of the system that are common with Russia. There are no
direct comparisons between Russia and Armenia; however, “Armenian case” helps to
understand Russia’s place and stage in the process of reforms.
Balzer and Askonas underline that in both Russia and China, the role of the govern-
ment in the Triple Helix is overstated and studies often focus on the potential for the
state to foster the creative process. The authors think that China is much more suc-
cessful than Russia in transforming its innovation system, not taking into consideration
that China started reforms much earlier than Russia and thus in Russia, in 50 years, the
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picture may be similar to the Chinese one. For example, China started to support a se-
lected group of “elite” universities in 1956, Russia—in 2006. Therefore, it would be in-
teresting to see where Chinese universities were in the 1980s of the XX century.
At the same time, observations regarding Russia and government policy are very
sharp and fare—authors state that Russian leaders have little patience and would like to
see fast results. Indeed, during the post-Soviet years, Russian government has intro-
duced a lot of measures aimed at strengthening linkages in the innovation system.
Many of these were borrowed from foreign (Western) experience. However, most of
measures did not last long; their implementation was poorly monitored and thus in-
struments were not working in the same way as abroad. This “lack of patience” along
with overall economic regulation made Russia less successful than China. This shows
that not only “effective mechanisms” should be applied but they have to be suited to
the right political context. And the authors make the politics-related conclusion:
“Russia under Vladimir Putin remains excessively focused on control and promoting
the state sector. There has been far less learning.”
Political theme is continued through the analysis of Armenia—a small part of Soviet
science empire with strong fundamental science. Inzelt states that the way of thinking
in Armenia still corresponds to a science-push model. In addition to that, the informa-
tion on the involvement of business in support of technological innovations is very
scarce and limited. Thus, such a general indicator as Business Expenditure on R&D is
unavailable for Armenia. There is also very limited information on the regulation of
public-private partnerships in this country, and incentives for cost-sharing. There are
no government programs for spin-offs as well. Overall, the business sector in Armenia
is not well developed, and the scarcity of innovative companies is a serious handicap
for industry-science collaborations. In this respect, Russia has moved further in pro-
moting innovation culture within its business sector. Therefore, Armenia presents the
case with very weak science-industry linkages.
Another noticeable aspect in comparative perspective is the process of reforms in the
Academies. Both Russia and Armenia have state Academies which for years were more
important generators of knowledge than universities. Armenian government introduced
a new law about its Academy in 2011—2 years earlier than Russia. Armenia faces the
same problems with the scientific workforce—aging, lack of interest, and capability for
innovation. The transformation process is painful and Russia is not alone in slow pace
of reforms. Inzelt concludes that the development of an interactive Triple Helix model
is time-consuming. This complements the findings of Balzer and Askonas, showing that
a time frame is a very important factor for analysis.
Specific instruments for knowledge transfer applied in Russia are analyzed in the
paper by Bychkova, Chernysh, and Popova who explore three measures aimed at
the development of industry-academia relations and in the paper of Grasmik who
analyzes creation of spin-offs as a mechanism of innovation development at the
regional level.
Bychkova et al. look at three different instruments—creation of spin-offs by uni-
versities and academy institutes, matching grants for R&D cooperation between
universities and industry, and centers of shared equipment. The authors consider
the latter instrument as the most successful one, which is disputable. They draw
their conclusions based on interviews mainly conducted in 2012 with a focus on
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top-down state strategies to enforce close positions between academic and indus-
trial partners.
Russia’s innovation policy is quite dynamic and therefore measures evaluated in 2012
will look differently from an analysis made in 2013. Thus, matching grants that are crit-
icized in the paper are assessed in other studies as instrument with many positive and
long-lasting side effects2 despite some bureaucratic obstacles. Then, centers of shared
equipment which are considered as success are not seen in such a positive way in some
other studies.3 The paper presents two models of centers of shared equipment—when
they belong to a company and when they are placed on the premises of a university.
The model when equipment belongs to a company is especially beneficial because it
allows for inviting professors and students to work for the company during a certain
period, i.e., intersectoral mobility ensures knowledge transfer. In either model, work-
ing together helps to better train students, and, most importantly, to develop trust
between researchers at a university and a company. The matter of mutual trust is
often explored in analytical works devoted to commercialization of R&D results. It is
an issue in many countries, not only in Russia. But in Russia, the mentality of mistrust
and strong disfavor when business venture fails creates additional difficulties for
innovative development.
Centers for shared equipment are not the only instrument among those observed by
Bychkova et al. that help to develop mutual trust. It is also true for matching grants, es-
pecially when a company on a daily basis collaborates with a university on a joint R&D
project. All these instruments are complementary and important for strengthening
horizontal science-industry linkages.
One of the three instruments mentioned by Bychkova et al.—creation of spin-offs—is
studied in more detail in Grasmik’s paper. He looks at this problem from another angle, at
a regional level, and sees spin-offs as the basis for networking. The paper touches the same
problem of linkages and mutual trust, as well as the development of social capital. Grasmik
divides the innovation networks into formal (R&D joint ventures, strategic alliances, etc.)
and informal, based on personal contacts such as friends, family, and previous colleagues.
In the Triple Helix model, formal technology transfer mechanisms do not always work ef-
fectively at early stages of the innovation system development. As a result, they are replaced
by interpersonal communication. The finding of the paper is based on the study of almost
2000 academic spin-offs established until May 2014 in Russia and explores the number of
external connections the companies have. The first striking finding is that almost half of
spin-offs created by universities have no ties with external companies. At the same time, a
regional dimension is more predictable. Calculation of the cumulative index characterizing
the intensity of contacts indicates that Moscow and Saint-Petersburg lead with a large ad-
vantage over others, followed by Tomsk, Tatarstan, and Novosibirsk. These are well-known
regional centers of innovation in Russia and the study confirms their status. Another con-
firmation of a known phenomenon demonstrated in the paper is the finding that the higher
the level of innovation activity in the economy of a region as a whole, and not only in large
companies, the higher the motivation to cooperate with local universities. And again,
Moscow and St. Petersburg considerably outperform other cities in size and economic pa-
rameters, while concentrating most of the country’s science base. The overall conclusion
underlines the importance of university-industry cooperation which intensity is directly
linked to the innovation intensity in the region.
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All five papers touch the issue of social capital in university-industry relations.
Knowledge transfer occurs through people, and the quality of linkages depends on
skills, experience in cooperation, and other factors. The last paper in the collection is
fully devoted to one of the aspects of social capital development—intersectoral mobil-
ity of researchers (Dezhina). Intersectoral mobility may acquire different forms:
permanent, when a researcher moves from one organization to another for a full-time
job; or temporary, as a part-time research work or consulting. Studies of internal
mobility show a positive relationship between the level of intersectoral mobility and
research productivity, which is the reason for a growing number of countries to intro-
duce measures stimulating such movement of the research workforce. The studies of
intersectoral mobility were mainly conducted abroad. They show that in most cases,
mobility and research output are positively connected, and both companies and
universities benefit from it. In Russia, intersectoral mobility is not widely spread and
there is scarce data on this phenomenon. Specific limitations to its study and
interpretation are related to the fact that in Russia, in contrast to many other
countries, a move from a university or a research institute to an industrial enterprise
in many cases means not just a change of place of work but a change of profession,
because those entering industry often assume positions of managers, not researchers.
In addition, in Russia, there are some specific obstacles to intersectoral mobility of
researchers. The practice of inbreeding, when universities fill positions of assistant
professors and professors preferentially with their own graduates presents an obstacle
to the mobility and also contributes to stagnation in research since the quality of
personnel becomes a secondary factor. In Russia, the scale of inbreeding is impressive:
about two thirds of teaching staff are working at the universities from which they
graduated.
The findings of the paper are derived from the case studies conducted at different
types of research organizations and companies in order to assess the current state of
intersectoral mobility in Russia and identify government measures that may fit best to
promote it. The study showed that the level of intersectoral mobility is low in both
directions—from universities and Academy institutes to industry and vice versa. The
major reasons for low mobility are not only historical traditions of inbreeding but also
low levels of industrial investments in R&D and thus insignificant interest in knowledge
transfer from universities and Academy.
All the papers in the “Russian collection” demonstrate the complexity and nonlinear
pace of reforms that have to lead to the Triple Helix model with developed horizontal
linkages. Russian innovation system is still a complex of double helices where govern-
ment is above other actors. Soviet legacy reflected in the mentality of decision makers
continues to be among crucial hampering factors.
Endnotes
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